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ABSTRACT
This paper presents evidence that productivity net of general training costs
rise 4 or 5 times more rapidly than wage rates during the first 2 years on a job.
This occurs for three reasons. First, sorting, high job search costs and the
reputational damages that result from premature separations cause workers to prefer
front loaded compensation packages which reduce the likelihood of involuntary
terminations. Second, due to progressive income taxation and poor access to credit,
workers discount the future more heavily than employers. Front-loading compensation
is, therefore, a relatively cheap way for employers to attract top quality new
hires. Finally, the minimum wage and union contracts also tend to force flat wage
profiles.
~
WHY ARE WAGE PROFILES SO FLAT DURING THE FIRST YEARS ON A JOB?
"
One of the central propositions of the human capital theory of on-the-job
training is that workers pay for and receive all the benefits of general
training. Since general training raises a worker's ability to be productive in
other organizations as well as the one providing the training, training firms
must pay a wage commensurate with the trained worker's new higher level of
productivity if they are to prevent the loss of their trained workers. Since
the workers, not the firm, get the benefits of the training, "firms [will]
provide general training only if they [do] not have to pay any of the costs"
(Becker 1962 p. 13). Since the training is of value to prospective trainees,
~
equilibrium in the training market requires that "employees pay for general on-
the-job training by receiving wages below what could be received elsewhere"
(Becker 1962 p. 13) in a job offering no training. Thus, the theory predicts
that when training is general, each worker's wage must equal that worker's
productivity net of training costs (the opportunity costs of the time others
spend training the employee). Since training investments typically diminish
with tenure, wage rates should rise more rapidly than productivity as tenure
increases.
~
Lazear's (1981) agency model of employment contracts provides still
another reason for expecting very low initial wages which then rise rapidly
with tenure. In jobs where effort is difficult to monitor, this model predicts
that workers are initially paid a wage that is below productivity net of
training costs in order to generate a performance bond. The purpose of this
bond is to insure that anyone fired for shirking suffers a serious loss, one
that is great enough to deter shirking. The employees who are retained by the
firm have this performance bond repaid to them in the form of a wage in the
final period which exceeds the worker's productivity. As a result, wages rise
more rapidly than productivity net of training costs.
This paper presents evidence contradicting the general validity of these
predictions. It argues on both theoretical and empirical grounds that during
the first year or so of a worker's tenure, wages rise more slowly than
productivity net of training costs when training is entirely general. Many
employers are induced to behave as if they were sharing the costs and benefits
of general on-the-job training with their employees. This occurs for three
reasons. First, sorting, high job search costs and the reputational damages
that result from premature separations make a dismissed worker's next best
2.
alternative decidedly unattractive and this causes workers to prefer front
loaded compensation packages which reduce the likelihood of involuntary
terminations. Second, since most young workers want to shift consumption from
the future into the present but can borrow only at prohibitively high interest
rates, employers take advantage of their better access to credit to front load
the compensation package, in effect offering new hires a loan which is forgiven
if the worker leaves. Finally, the minimum wage and union contracts prevent
young workers from agreeing to the low starting wages that would be necessary
if they were to self-finance general on-the-job training.
The first section of the paper offers a theory of wage profiles and
training decisions which explains why the first two of these factors cause
compensation to be front loaded. The second section evaluates the substantive
importance of these explanations of front loaded compensation packages and
proposes to test this theory by comparing wage growth in the first year of
tenure on a job to the growth of productivity net of training costs. The third
section of the paper reviews previous empirical research comparing rates of
growth of wages and productivity. Section 4 describes a unique data set from
which it is possible to derive estimates of the relative growth rates of wages
and productivity net of training costs early in a worker's tenure at a firm.
Section 5 compares the calculated growth rate of productivity net of training
costs to the growth of real wages with tenure for jobs whose training appears
to be predominantly general. The paper concludes with a summary and discussion
of policy implications.
The theory to be presented owes much to Hashimoto's (1981) elegant
formulation of how workers and firms share the costs and benefits of
investments that are specific to a match between worker and firm.
~
Sorting effects, transfer costs, turnover events as signals and differential
access to capital markets are all incorporated into one model. Some of the
important implications of the model(~~as follows:
0 Match specific quasi-rents lower the second period wage below the
worker's productivity in the firm and raise the first period wage by a
compensating amount. Five different sources of match specific quasi-
rents are identified: (1) specific training, (2) the damage to a
worker's reputation from being fired or quitting, (3) the adjustment
costs of finding another job and adjusting to it, (4) the improvement
in the average productivity of the remaining workers that results from
dismissing the least productive, and (5) the sorting effect that
results from the exit of those with the best alternative opportunities
and those who dislike their current job.
3
.' 0 When elasticities of labor supply are greater for new hires than for
trained workers with more than a year or so of tenure at the firm, the
time pattern of compensation will reflect the relative rate at which
employers and workers discount future earnings and the wage
elasticities of voluntary and involuntary turnover. Since the young
workers who need general training the most have only limited access to
capital markets, they discount the future much more heavily than their
employer and as a result compensation tends to be front loaded.
~.
0 During the first year on a job
training costs grows much more
training is completely general
appear to be sharing the costs
training.
a worker's productivity net of
rapidly than the wage even when
and employers, therefore, may
and benefits of general
~
While some of these results have appeared in earlier papers (eg. Parsons 1972;
Glick and F~uer 1984), much of the recent wage growth literature appears to
ignore the impact of differential access to capital markets, the reputational
effects of a dismissal and specific human capital investments other than
training. on wage growth (Garen 1988). The purpose of this paper is to point
out just how important these effects are by incorporating these factors in a
formal model and then by reviewing empirical literature on transition costs and
liquidity constraints to show that when reasonable assumptions are made about
their magnitude, big changes occur in predicted rates of wage growth during the
first year on the job.
I. THEORY
The firm's training level and wage profile will be analyzed in a simple
tWo period model. Training is assumed to produce tWo types of skills: general
skills (g) which are useful at other firms and specific skills (h) which are
productive only at the firm providing training. The cost of the training
C(g,h) are incurred in the first period and the benefits are received in the
second period. There are two random elements in the model. The first is the
utility that a worker can attain by leaving the firm at the beginning of the
second period, and the second is the worker's second period productivity in
this firm after the training is completed. We assume that wages and
productivity in the tWo periods are the following.
Worker
Productivity
1st periodat the firm P
2nd periodat the firm P+g+h+Eo
2nd period at other firms if quit
2nd period at other firms if fired/1aidoff
Worker
Ut~pty
W2
U(g)
U(g)
- T + E
-T -Fb +E
4where
"
.
P is the worker's productivity without training
g is the increment in productivity due to general training
h is the increment in productivity at the firm due to specific training
£0 is the random factor in productivity in this firm which captures one
element of the quality of the match at the training firm
wI, W2 are the first and second period wages at the firm
U(g)+E is the utility of the best alternative job if one leaves
voluntarily. This depends on the amount of general skill and a
random factor which measures from the worker's point of view the
quality of the firm-worker match at the alternative firm relative
to the match at the training firm.
T is the costs of transition if the change in jobs is initiated by the
worker: moving costs, reputational damage from having the quit
signal on one's resume, lost income while waiting for the n~xt
job to start.
~
~
~e additional transition costs imposed on the worker over and above T,
if the exit is involuntary: the additional damage to the worker's
reputation from being permanently laid off or fired rather than
leaving voluntarily, the lost income due to the wait until another
job is found.
Turnover decisions are made in two stages. At the end of the first
period, the worker makes the first move by deciding whether to quit or to
express an intention to stay. If the worker quits, he/she obtains a job which
offers a utility level of U(g)-T+E. The worker but not his employer learns
about E at the end of the first period.
Then the firm decides whether to keep or dismiss the worker by comparing
the second period wage to the worker's productivity in the firm, P+g+h+E. If
the worker's productivity is less than the second period wage, the firm will
dismiss the worker. The random factor EO is a measure of the quality of the
firm-worker match at the current firm. If the worker is dismissed at this
stage he/she will be forced to look for work while unemployed and will incur an
additional transition cost of Fb. Therefore, the worker's first stage decision
will take into account the risk of involuntary turnover in the second stage.
At the beginning of the first period neither the worker nor the firm knows
the worker's exact productivity in this firm and in other firms. The firm
offers wage package (Wl,W2) based on information obtained in the, interview and
from references and the nature of uncertainties involved, i.e. the probabliity
density function's of EO and E. In the first period, the firm trains the
5h
.worker, taking into account the possible loss of the investment due to a
separation in the next period. Training investment takes two forms, investment
in firm specific skills and general skills. General training increases the
wage that the worker can obtain in alternative employment as well as his
productivity in this firm. Yorkers accept the job offer from this firm if the
wage package and training plan are generous enough to attract workers in a
competitive labor market. In deciding, the worker takes account of possible
gains or losses from a voluntary or involuntary separation. Ye assume the
worker and the firm have the same prior distributions on the uncertainties
surrounding the worker's productivity in this firm and worker's income
opportunity outside the firm in the second period. Further, we assume that
both the firm and the worker are risk neutral.
The firm's objective is to maximize the discounted sum of profit from the
two periods by choosing wage rates in two periods, yl and y2, and an amount of
general training, g, and specific training, h, subject to the constraint that
the wage offer and amount of training are generous enough to attract new hires
in a competitive labor market. The firm's expected profit maximization problem
when £ and £0 are independent is written as:
(1) Max P - C(g,h)
-
WI + 6a[Fr(S)Fr(K)(F+g+h+E(coIK)-W2»)
g, h, yl, y2
Subject to the constraint
(2) R S yl +
6b[Pr(S)pr(K)y2 + (I-Pr(S»(U-T+E(£IQ» + Pr(S)(I-Pr(K»(U-T+E(£IS)-Fb)]
or R ~ yl + 6b[Pr(S)Pr(K){y2
- U + T - E(£IS) - 1;~~~~)Fb} + U -T]
where
E(£oIK) is the conditional expectation of £0 given that the firm wishes
to keep the worker.
E(£IQ) is the conditional expectation of € given that the worker quits
the firm.
E(£IS) is the conditional expectation of £ given the worker wishes to
stay in the firm. E(£/S) < O.
6a and 6b are fixed discount factors of the firm and worker, respectively
PreS) is the prior probability the worker is willing to stay with
the firm
6Pr(K) is the prior probability the firm is willing to keep the worker
,- R is the level of expected utility the worker can attain in the
competitive labor market.
At the end of the first period, the worker learns what utility can be
obtained by taking a job at another firm. Based on this information, the
worker's decision rule is:
STAY IF Pr(K)W2 + (l-Pr(K»(U-T-Fb+E) > U - T + E
The right hand side of the inequality is the utility level of the alternative
job. It is affected by the amount of general training that other employers
perceive the worker to have obtained, g, and the costs of making a voluntary
transition, (T), and the random term, (E), which captures the worker's
relative evaluation of two jobs. The left hand side of the inequality is the
expected income if he/she wishes to stay at the firm. Note that the expected
income of choosing to stay takes into account the risk of being fired or laid
off and suffering the additional transition costs (Fb) that involuntary
turnover imposes on the worker. The probability of a worker wishing to stay
in the firm, Pr(S) , is:
(3) PreS) - Pr(E ~ w2 U T - I-PrlK)F )+ Pr(K) b
- ~(W2 - U + T - l;~~~~) Fb)
where ~ is the cumulative density function of E.
Note that the argument for the cumulative density funtion, ~, contains the
l-PrlK) .
term
- Pr(K) Fb' which 1S minus the odds of being laid off or fired times the
additional transition costs, Fb' that result from involuntary turnover. This
implies that if a worker believes there is a high probability of being laid
off or fired, he is more likely to quit.
By the end of the first period, the firm knows the worker's productivity
in the second period and whether the worker wants to stay. It then lays off
or fires the worker if P+g+h+Eo is less than the second period wage.
Consequently, Pr(K) is written as
(4) Pr(K) - Pr(P+g+h+Eo > W2)
- 1 - ~o(W2_p-g-h)
where
~o is the cumulative density function of EO'
7.
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Denoting the probability density function of E and EO by ~ and
~o the first
order condition for the second period wage is written as:
(5) 0 - Oa[8:~~S).pr(K)Qa
- Pr(S)Pr(K)] + °b[Pr(S)Pr(K) - ~oPr(S)~]
where Qa and
~
are defined as
Qa - P + g + h + E(EOIK)
-
y2 > 0,
~ -
y2
- (U(g) - T - Fb + E(EIS»
8pr~S)
- ~(l-v)ay
v - p;fu2Fb - -:~ft
> o.
1k - the elasticity of the firm's keep rate, pr(K)~ with respect to the
2nd period wage times minus one. 1k - ~oy /Pr(K) > o.
fb - Fb/W2 is the ratio of the transition cost if fired to the 2nd period
wage.
Qa is the firm's expected profit on workers who want to stay with the firm and
which the firm wants to keep. Alternatively, it is the employer's share of
2nd period quasi-rents.
~
is the gain the worker receives from not being
dismissed or alternatively the worker's share of 2nd period quasi rents. It
is the difference between the second period wage, y2, and expected utility if
dismissed, (U(g)-T-Fb+E(EIS». Note that ~0/Pr(K)2 is the derivative of the
odds of being kept with respect to the second period wage. An increase in the
second period wage has two effects on the worker's decision to stay. The
direct effect increases the desire to stay. The second effect is that it
raises the odds of being permanently laid off or fired and incurring the added
transition costs Fb. While this second effect lowers the probability of
staying, we may reasonably assume that the total effect of a wage increase on
PreS) is positive,( i.e. O<v<l ) because the elasticity of the keep rate, 1k'
is not likely to exceed 1 and the extra transition cost of an involuntary
termination is probably less than 20 percent of the 2nd period wage.
The first order conditions for specific and general training (h and g)
are given by (6) and (7).
(6) Ch - °aPr(K) [Pr(S) + (8Pr(S)/8h)Qa] + °bPr(S)~o~
where Ch - BC/Bh, BPr(S)/Bh - ~v,
(7) Cg - °aPr(K)[Pr(S) + (8Pr(S)/Bg)Qa] + °b[(l-Pr(K)Pr(S»Ug + ~oPr(S)~]
where Cg - BC/Bg, Ug - I, BPr(S)/Bg - ~(-Ug+v)
8.
.
These conditions can be more simply represented by:
(6') Ch - SaPr(SK)[l + 7svqa] + SbPr(SK)7kqb
(7') Cg - SaPr(SK)[l + 7s(v-l)qa] + Sb[(l-Pr(SK» + Pr(SK)7kqb]
where
Pr(SK) - Pr(S)Pr(K) is the probability the worker is at the firm in the
second period
qa - Qa/W2, the ratio of the firm's quasi rent to the 2nd period wage
qb - Qb/W2, the ratio of the worker's quasi rent to the 2nd period wage
7s - the elasticity of the worker's stay rate with respect to the 2nd
period wage. 7s - ~(l-v)W2/Pr(S) > O.
The first order condition for specific capital, (6'), says that the
marginal cost of investment in specific capital is equated to the marginal
discounted revenue to the firm, the discount factor times the retention rate
and the marginal increase in the stay rate resulting from the reduced
probability of being terminated involuntarily times the share of the second
period wage that is a quasi rent for the employer, (SaPr(SK)[l + 7kvqa]), plus
the discounted marginal benefit to the worker of the specific training. The
benefit of specific training to the worker is captured by the second term of
(6'). The increased productivity makes the firm less likely to dismiss the
worker. This effect is captured by 7k' the elasticity of the keep rate with
respect to the second period wage. In (6') 7k is multiplied by qb' the share
of the second period wage that is a quasi rent for the worker.
Also the optimal wage in the first period, WI, is determined so that the
constraint (2) is binding. The first order conditions--(5), (6), (7) and (2)
with equality constraint--characterize the optimal wage-training package the
firm will offer. Substituting first order conditions for W2 into the
condition determining the level of general human capital investment and
rearranging terms, we get the familiar condition in which the marginal cost of
general training is equated to the worker's discount factor:
(7") Cg - Sb
In what follows, we examine the implications of these conditions for the wage
profile.
Choosing the Waie Profile
Making use of the assumption that competitive equilibrium implies that
9.-
the expected profit from hiring the marginal worker is zero, the optimal wage
rates for the two periods may be written as follows:
-
.ua~~Z-
6 a"Ys+6a"Yk
(9) WI - P - C(~,h) + 6@Pr(S)Pr(K){e[h +T +Fb +E(£gIK) -E(£IS)] +
~:;~~~}
(8) y2
- [P+h+g+E(£oIK)] - e[h + T + Fb + E(£oIK) - E(£IS)]
where e - -2.b:lk-
6a"Ys+6b"Yk
is the employer's share of the costs of specific human
capital investments and of quasi rents.
Equation (8) implies that the expected profit from the worker staying with the
firm is positive. Since in long run equilibrium, competition among firms
brings the expected profit of the firm to zero, the wage rate in the first
period must be higher than the worker's productivity net of training cost by a
compensating amount. Thus our model predicts that in the early stage of
employment, productivity net of training cost grows faster than the wage rate.
The firm's net profit is negative in the investment period but the loss is
compensated in the second period when the firm receives the return from human
capital investment.
The wage offer in the second period is the expected productivity of the
worker, P+g+h+E(£oIK), less the second and third terms in (8). The expression
in the second set of brackets is the difference (for those who are kept and
want to stay) between the worker's productivity in the firm, P+g+h+E(£oIK),
and the utility of the worker's best alternative job if he/she is laid off or
fired, P+g-T-Fb+E(£IS). The second term indicates that given the value of e,
the following factors raise the firm's first period wage offer and reduce the
firm's second period wage offer:
-- Transition costs if the exit is voluntary, (T)
-- The additional transition costs of the worker resulting from being
laid off or fired, (Fb)
-- The average unattractiveness of alternative employment for workers who
want to stay, (-E(£IS».
Costly investments in firm specific training--eg. h for which C(h) : h--
lower first period wages by less than the costs of training, increase second
period wages by less than the productivity benefits of training and increase
rates of wage growth by less than the resulting increase in productivity net
of training costs.
10
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Costless increases in second period firm specific productivity tend to
raise wage offers in both the first and the second period. In the context of
this model the factors which improve the firm specific productivity of workers
in the second period without raising costs during the first period are:
-- Firm specific learning by doing [hd for which C(hd)-O]; and
-- The firm's expected gain from having the option of dismissing less
productive workers, (E(EOIK».
These two factors have an ambiguous effect on the rate of wage growth. An
increase in the importance of either of these two factors will lower the rate
of wage growth if: 6aPr(S)Pr(K)0 > 1-0.
Also, other things being equal, first period wage offers
period wage offer decline if 0, the employer's share of quasi
increased. Factors that makes 0 larger are:
rise and second
rents, is
-- The wage elasticity of the keep rate increases relative to the
elasticity of the worker's willingness to stay at the firm. (ie.
~k is
large relative to ~s). This could be caused by
~o being large
relative to ~ or by v being close to 1.
-- High incremental transition costs when turnover is involuntary, (Fb) ,
result in workers becoming so fearful of dismissals that they prefer
contracts in which employers finance a larger share of firm specific
investments so as to reduce their risks of dismissal. If Fb is large
relative to y2, v becomes larger.
-- The worker's valuation of future earnings grows relative to the
firm's valuation. (ie. 6b/6a becomes larger).
Yorkers must pay higher interest rates when they borrow than employers
and also tend to face higher marginal tax rates during the payoff period than
the training period. The third term of (8) and (9) represents the effects of
their consequent tendency to discount future returns more heavily than
employers. Since the error term in the quit relationship does not have a
degenerate distribution, the supply of trained labor is not infinitely
elastic. Bloch (1979) cross section analysis of turnover in 49 manufacturing
industries, for example, found wage elasticities of -1.3 for quit rates and
.85 for the layoff rates when the lagged accession rate was included in the
model. The supply of untrained labor, however, is assumed to be infinitely
elastic at R. New hires take second period wages into account when evaluating
the firm's job offer, however, so the decline in the elasticity of labor
supply with the worker's tenure influences the wage structure only when the
firm and its workers discount the future at different rates. The compensation
packages reflect the worker's preference for compensation now rather than
11
"
later. Thus, the third term of (8) and (9) implies that the firm's second
period wage will be reduced and the first period wage increased to the extent
that:
-- The firm's discount factor is large relative to the worker's discount
factor, (Sa-Sb is large).
-- The elasticities of the worker's stay rate, 1s' and of the firm's keep
rate, 1k' with respect to the firm's second period wage are small.
III. The Magnitude of Transition Costs and Differential
Time Preference Effects
Quasi Rents Generated by Sorting. Job Search Costs
and Dama~ed Reputations
In most matches between a worker and a firm there is a substantial
difference between the average productivity of workers who stick with the firm
and the expected utility of alternative employment of those who wish to stay
at the firm but are nevertheless terminated involuntarily. This difference,
the quasi rent associated with the match, is given by the expression:
(10) Quasi Rent - [h + T + Fb + E(£oIK)
- E(£IS)] - Qa + ~
By sharing these quasi rents, both parties try to induce the other to maintain
the contract. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th terms inside the bracketed expression
are often quite large. Even when training is entirely general (h-O) , this
makes it optimal for the firm to pay wages which exceed productivity minus
training costs in the first period and to offer a wage in the second period
which is correspondingly lower than productivity in the second period. The
rate of wage growth is considerably below the rate of growth of productivity
net of training costs and the firm appears to pay part of the costs of general
training. Nevertheless, marginal increases in general training do have the
effect on the wage structure predicted by Becker--starting wages decline by
the incremental costs of the increased general training and second period
wages rise by the full amount of the increase in worker productivity. Workers
do not appear to be paying the full costs of their general training because
employers are offering to share some of the risks attached to the new
12
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relationship--transition costs and reputational damage from possible
dismissa1s--and because the employer is in effect lending the worker money.
Transition Costs-Job Search and ReDutations
The substantive importance of the points just made depends on just how
large the transition costs, T and Fb' are. The transition cost T is in part
adjustment costs such as moving costs and the unhappiness resulting from
losing friendships at work. A second reason why T is expected to be positive
is that, for most workers, a quit damages one's reputation. A quit after a
short time on the job is likely to be interpreted as a signal of problems that
may recur, a lack of commitment to ones's job or a high quit propensity.
Hollenbeck and Smith's (1984) study of employer reactions to resumes found
that the number of quits in the job history had a large negative effect on the
rating assigned to the job applicant.1
The third term of the quasi rent expression, Fb' is the additional costs
associated with involuntary terminations. Such terminations are very costly
for the worker because (1) finding another job takes a great deal of time and
is psychologically stressful and (2) a discharge does even more damage to a
worker's reputation than a quit. Involuntarily terminated workers seldom
have another job lined up so they immediately enter the ranks of the
unemployed. Dynarski and Sheffrin (1987) have calculated that the expected
length of a spell of unemployment was 10.3 weeks in 1980-81 for the household
heads in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data. Using 1974 CPS data, Clark
and Summers (1979) calculated that if unemployed workers did not leave the
labor force, it took on average 12.6 weeks for teenagers to find another job
and 16.2 for those over 20 years of age to find another job. Blau and Robins'
(1985) analysis of longitudinal data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot
Projects found that it took on average 25 to 36 weeks for unemployed welfare
recipients to find a job and 15 to 20 weeks for unemployed workers not on
welfare to find a job.2 If the termination is a dismissal or a layoff
occurring after only a few months on the job, the individual may not be
eligible for unemployment insurance. These costs are the natural consequences
of involuntary turnover. They have not been generated by implicit contracts
in which workers are required to put up a bond against shirking.
When they find another job, it typically pays less. In the National
Longitudinal Survey, young men who changed employers between 1967 and 1973
subsequent to an involuntary separation experienced a 3 percent decline in
their wage rate over the two year measurement period. For the mature men's
sample the wage decline was 10 percent. These effects appear to persist for
13
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many years. Models were estimated in which dummies for a separation between
1969 and 1971 were used to predict wage growth during 1967-69 and 1971-73 as
well as for 1969-71. The workers who were involuntarily terminated between
1969 and 1971 experienced a sharp deceleration in their wage growth which
persisted into 1971-73 (Bartel and Borjas 1981). Analyzing a five year time
interval in PSID data, Ruhm (1987) found that involuntary terminations lowered
the wage growth of male household heads by 13.6 percent but had no significant
effect on the wage growth of female household heads. These wage reductions
arise partly because the individual's specific human capital is now worthless,
partly because of Lazear type bonding contracts (if they do indeed exist for
young workers) and partly because quits and dismissals are signals which
damage the worker's reputation.
The unemployment durations and wage reductions reported above are for sll
involuntarily terminated workers as a group. While no study reported separate
estimates of the effects of discharges and layoffs, one suspects that those
discharged experience longer spells of unemployment and bigger wage declines
than those laid off. Many employers contact a job candidate's previous
employers prior to making a final hiring decision andt- therefore, may
learn of the discharge. If the job seeker does not include the employer who
discharged him in his employment history, there is a long stretch of
nonemployment that must somehow be explained. Discharged employees are
reported to be 25 percent less productive than the workers who end up staying
with a firm for a year or more (Bishop 1988). In some cases this productivity
disadvantage is specific to the match, but it is difficult for other employers
to assess whether that is the case so if they know a job applicant was fired
by a previous employer, they are unlikely to hire him/her.
Since the costs of an involuntary termination are so severe, job seekers
would be expected to prefer employers and employment contracts which minimize
risks of discharge and layoff and which promise that bad recommendations will
~
not be given. Promises not to give bad oral recommendations are not
enforceable, however, so the worker's only recourse is to seek contracts which
minimize the risk of dismissal and layoff. Seniority protection, grievance
procedures and enforceable promises to dismiss a worker only after certain
procedures are followed are one way to accomplish this but in nonunion
settings there are always ways of forcing an unwanted employee out. A more
reliable way of reducing the risk of dismissal and layoff is to have the
employer put up a bond which is forfeited if the worker is laid off or
dismissed. Workers, therefore, prefer employment contracts containing a front
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loaded compensation package. There are, of course, countervailing forces such
as the desire to reduce the number of trained employees who quit, so the form
of the contract depends on how the various forces balance out.
The fourth and fifth terms of the bracketed expression capture the effect
of sorting on the quasi rent. As the worker and the" firm learn more about
the quality of the match, the unsuccessful matches tend to be terminated. The
workers who discover that they do not like the job or that they have better
opportunities elsewhere quit and the workers who are the least productive on
the job are fired or induced to quit. Thus, even when training develops only
general skills and there are no transition costs, the expectation of the
difference between the productivity of workers who stick with the firm and
their evaluation of the next best alternative--the quasi rent attached to the
match--is considerably greater for long tenure workers than for recent hires.3
Sorting's effect on average productivity has been estimated to be at least 2.6
percent between the fourth and seventeenth month on the job at small and
medium sized non-union firms (Bishop 1988). Sorting is also generated by
differences in tastes for the nonpecuniary features of a job and differences
in alternative opportunities. Consequently, sorting probably causes quasi
rents equal to 4 to 8 percent of yearly compensation. Transition costs
probably generate quasi rents equal to another 5 or 10 percent of
compensation.4 The growth of these quasi rents during the first year causes
wage growth to diverge from the growth of productivity net of training cost.
If (T + Fb + E(fOIK) - E(fIS)] is 10 percent of compensation in the second
period, a 8 (the employer's share of specific investments) of .5 implies that
second period wages are reduced by 5 percent and a 8 of .8 implies they are
reduced by 8 percent. If the investment and payoff periods are of equal
length, wage growth will be 8[1 + 6aPr(S)Pr(K)] (.10) less than the growth of
productivity net of training costs. With a discount factor of .9, a retention
ratio of .7, wages rise 8.1 percent less than productivity net of training
costs when 8 is .5 and rise 13.1 percent less when 8 is .8. If the payoff
period is twice as long as the investment period, the reduction in percentage
growth is 11.2 percent when 8 is .5 and 18.3 percent when 8 is .8. Clearly,
transition costs and sorting effects can have significant effects on the time
pattern of compensation in the first year or so of a job.
The magnitude of quasi rents vary across workers so the supply of
trained labor with respect to their wage is not infinitely elastic.
Consequently, while preventing other firms from hiring away trained labor is
an important objective in setting the second period wage, there is room for
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other factors to playa role as well (Glick and Feuer 1984). The other
factors that can now influence the wage profile are differences in access to
capital markets, differences in marginal tax rates and constraints on wage
setting due to unions and wage minimums.
The Effects of Differential Access to CaDi tal Markets
The second force tending to lower wage growth below the growth of
productivity net of training costs is the fact that most workers receiving
substantial amounts of general training discount the future much more heavily
than their emp10yers.5 This force is represented by the term on the far right
hand side of equations 7 and 8 where it results in 6a-6b > O. Most young
workers (the ones who have the greatest need for general training) have
neither assets which can be depleted (to maintain consumption at acceptable
levels during general training) nor access to credit at reasonable terms.
Half of households headed by someone under the age of 25 have less than $746
in financial assets and 19 percent have no financial assets at all. Half of
households headed by someone between 25 and 34 have less than $1514 in
financial assets and 13 percent have none (Survey of Consumer Finances 1984).
Subsidized or guaranteed student loans are not available to finance on-the-job
training and banks will not lend money for this purpose without collateral.
Borrowing against the equity in one's home is a possibility for some but only
34 percent of households with heads under the age of 35 own a home and many of
the houses have been owned for only a short while so the equity that can be
borrowed against is small (Hubbard and Judd 1986). Even with collateral, the
loans available to individuals usually carry higher interest rates than those
charged businesses.
Progressive Taxation
In addition, the progressive nature of the personal income tax means that
workers face higher marginal tax rates on the fruits of training investments
than they are paying when they incur the costs of such investments. Firms, on
the other hand, train continuously, so the marginal tax rates faced when the
costs of training are incurred and expensed are no different from those faced
during the payoff period.
These two factors result in firms being more willing than workers to
trade off future earnings for present earnings. The compensation packages
that result from the asymmetric access to capital markets and the progressive
tax structure reflect the worker's strong preference for compensation now
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rather than later. If, for example, 6a - .9, 6b - .75 and both 7a and 7b - 1,
the second period wage is reduced by 9.1 percent. If the two time periods are
of equal length, the first period wage is increased by 5.7 percent and wage
growth is reduced by 14.8 percent. If the wage elasticity of keep rates and
stay rates is doubled to 2, then the wage growth effect is cut in half to 7.4
percent. If the payoff period is double the length of the investment period,
the wage growth is reduced by 20.5 percent when wage elasticities, 7a and 7b,
are 1 and by 10.2 percent when wage elasticities are 2. In effect, firms
offer new hires a loan that will be canceled if a separation occurs. Firms do
not require repayment of the loan when separations occur for the same reasons
that banks do not offer large unsecured loans without a government guarantee
of payment. The administrative costs of obtaining repayment are extremely
high and bankruptcy is a real option for someone with zero assets.
Constraints on Wage Settin~: Leia1 and Contractual
The third force that tends to lower wage ,growth below the growth of
productivity net ~f training costs is legal and contractual constraints on the
starting wage rate. For entry level jobs obtained by young workers, the
minimum wage is an important source of such rigidity in the United States and
in those European countries with similar legislation (Hashimoto 1982). In
European countries that have lower minimum wages for youth (eg. Netherlands)
or no governmental legislation (eg. Germany) and in adult jobs where
legislated minimums are not a binding constraint, collective bargaining
agreements are an alternative mechanism for mandating a flat wage profile.
Most unions appear to prefer flat wage profiles. The motive might be to
maintain solidarity between workers or to restrict access to the occupation by
discouraging the provision of general occupational training. The reasons for
a collective worker preference for flat wage profiles is not analyzed, the
desire is treated as an exogenous constraint on the structure of an optimal
contract.
Thus, our model offers three different reasons why wages may rise less
rapidly during the first year on the job than productivity net of training
costs when training is entirely general. The theory of general on-the-job
training predicts, instead, that when training is entirely general (ie. h-O) ,
wages will rise at the same rate as productivity net of training costs. The
Salop/Salop (1976) and Nickell (1976) adverse selection models predict that
wages will rise at the same rate as productivity net of training costs even
when much of training is specific to the firm.6 Agency theory goes even
. further and predicts that wages will grow more rapidly than productivity net
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of training costs when training is entirely general. Consequently, a
comparison of these growth rates is a natural and powerful way to test the
efficacy of these competing theories. This paper provides such a comparison
of wage and productivity net of training cost growth rates during the first
year on the job for a sample of 1493 workers hired by small and medium sized
establishments during 1980 and 1981. The next section of the paper reviews
previous empirical research on the subject.
III. Previous Research on the Effects of
Tenure on Productivity and Waies.
Medoff and Abraham (1981) were the first to analyze data in which it is
possible to compare the growth of wages and productivity with tenure. Using
micro-data on long tenure employees from the personnel records of four large
U.S. corporations, Medoff and Abraham found that, within a grade level,
experience was positively associated with wage rates but negatively associated
with performance ratings. They concluded that, "under the assumption that
rated performance is a valid indicator of relative productivity, our results
imply that a substantial fraction of the return to experience among the groups
we are studying is unrelated to productivity" (p. 187). Medoff and Abraham
also reviewed a number of other studies and concluded that the association
between seniority in a job and productivity is curvilinear. During the
initial very short orientation/training period there was a positive
association. Once this training period was over, however, there tended to be
a negative association between tenure and productivity among those who occupy
a particular job (i.e., have not been promoted to greater responsibility).
Almost all the studies were conducted in large corporations and almost all of
the workers included in these studies had many years of tenure at the firm.
These findings suggest that Lazear's agency model is one of the explanations
of the rise of wage rates with tenure at large firms once the initial 1-5 year
learning period is completed7.
It is not clear, however, that the finding that wages rise more rapidly
than productivity extends to small .firms or to workers with only a year or so
of tenure. Small firms are significantly different from large firms.
Turnover is higher in small firms and more contingent on performance so the
sorting explanation of wage and productivity growth should be more relevant to
small firms than to large firms (Bishop 1988). Monitoring problems are not as
severe at small firms so Lazear's agency theory explanation for backloading
compensation is less applicable at these firms. Reinforcing this is the fact
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that small firms do not have well established reputations which might be
damaged by reneging on a Lazear type bonding contract. As a result, workers
may be reluctant to enter into such contracts with small firms. The
circumstances are also different in the first year of employment for turnover
is higher, training is greater and productivity is rising rather than falling.
In fact, there is an abundance of evidence that in the first few months
on a job, productivity rises dramatically while wages are rising only
modestly. Industrial engineers have found that the learning curve for many
jobs is such that new hires make almost no contribution to output for many
weeks and often take a year or more to reach the productivity standard (King
1964, Talbot and Ellis 1969). If all this learning were firm specific and
employers financed all of its costs, this pattern might be consistent with
standard theory. But standard models of the sharing of the costs of specific
training do not predict that employers pay all of its costs and, indeed,
adverse selection theory predicts that employers pay none of the costs of
specific training. The specific training explanation of the flat wage profile
is particularly suspect when to all outward appearances much of the training
is useful at other firms (as it is when a new secretary spends the first few
weeks on a job learning Word Perfect, a word processing program used by many
other employers).
Studies of who appears to pay the costs of apprenticeship training, a
form of training that is industry specific but not firm specific, in three
different nations--Germany, Great Britain, and the United States--a11
contradict the claim that employers will only offer apprenticeship training
when the training wage is low enough and the apprenticeship period long enough
for the employer to recover all training investments by the end of the
apprenticeship ( Atkinson 1982; Noll et a1 1984; Ryan 1980; Jones 1985;
Weiderho1d-Fritz 1985). Despite the transferable character of the training
and high turnover rates, these studies concluded that employers made large
investments that were not recovered during the apprenticeship. A welding
apprenticeship program at a major U.S. shipyard was the subject of the first
of these studies (Ryan 1980). The wage profile was quite f1at--starting at
$3.99 and topping out at $5.26 after about two years on the job--even though
the investments in general training were very considerable. Inexperienced new
hires spent 36 days in vestibule training before beginning work. During the
first week following vestibule training, the trainee's output net of repair
requirements was less than 10 percent of an experienced worker's output.
Thirty-seven weeks after being hired it reached a level of 55 percent and at
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60 weeks a level of 80 percent of an experienced workers output. Despite the
fact that the local economy was in deep recession, monthly separation rates
were extremely high: 10.8 percent for beginners and 6.3 percent for those with
12 to 24 months of tenure. The shipyard accounted for about one-fifth of the
welding jobs in the area. When trained welders left the shipyard, they
typically found better paying welding jobs at other local employers. This
evidence clearly establishes that despite training being highly general, wage
growth was substantially slower than the growth of productivity net of
training costs. It appears that the shipbuilding company was contributing to
the costs of general training.
The study of German apprenticeship training by the Bundersinstitut fur
Berufsforschung found that in 1980 the employer share of apprenticeship
training costs ranged from a high of 25,200 DM per year for telecommunications
technician apprentices to 2400 DM for apprentice gardeners and averaged 10,300
DM or $5668 per year at 1980 exchange rates. The apprentice's contribution to
output, which was netted out to arrive at the above figure, averaged 6700 DM
per year (Weiderhold-Fritz 1985). In Great Britain employers claimed "We pay
them far more than they're worth (Atkinson 1982 p. 9)." The employer's share
of training costs (net of apprentice contribution to output) wasi3032 per
year in engineering,~ 1180 per year in road transport and~1870 per year in
construction. Even major upward revisions of estimates of the
apprentice's contribution to output would not change the basic conclusion that
employers appear to be sharing the costs of general training. While the
German and British studies have large enough samples to make generalizations
possible, a case study of one occupation at one firm is much too small a data
base for generalizations about the U.S. This paper tests whether Ryan's case
study finding can be replicated in a larger and more representative sample of
U.S. jobs.
IV. Data
An employer survey sponsored by the National Institute of Education and
the National Center for Research in Vocational Education conducted between
February and June 1982 provides the basis for our test of these theories.8
Each of the 3412 surveyed employers was asked a series of questions about
"the last new employee your company hired prior to August 1981 regardless of
whether that person is still employed by your company." In order to minimize
problems of recall and of adjusting actual starting wage rates for inflation
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since the date of hire, the sample employed in this paper is a subset of 1493
employers who hired someone after July 1980 and answered, all the questions
about wage rates,productivity and training. Most of the respondents were the
owners/managers of the small establishments (70 percent had fewer than 50
employees) who were quite familiar with the performance of each of the firm's
employees.
The survey asked the employer (or in larger firms the immediate
supervisor) to report on productivity of the typical individual hired in the
job after 2 weeks, during the next 11 weeks and at the end of 2 years at the
firm. The supervisor was asked to do the rating on a "scale of zero to 100
where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of your employees in
(NAME'S) position can obtain and zero is absolutely no productivity by your
employee." For the full data set the mean values of these indexes of
reported productivity were 49.0 for the first 2 weeks, 64.6 for the next 11
weeks and 81.4 at the time of the interview. The questions asking for a
rating of the productivity of particular workers had remarkably low 4.4
percent nonresponse rate.9
The interview questions about the productivity of recently hired
employees do not measure productivity in any absolute sense and therefore are
not comparable across firms or across jobs in a firm. Rather, they are
intended as ratio scale indicators of the relative productivity of individual
workers at different points in time. This is a crucial assumption and the
sensitivity of results to changes in this assumption will be carefully
examined. If these productivity indexes are proportional transformations of
true productivity plus a random error, percentage differences in cell means of
the productivity index will be unbiased estimators of percentage differences
in true productivity. If the variations in the productivity scores assigned
by supervisors exaggerate the proportionate variations in the true
productivity, our estimates of percentage increases in productivity during the
first year on the job will be biased downward. Even though it is possible for
a worker's true productivity to be negative, the scale was defined as having a
lower limit of zero. Floors and ceilings on a scale typically cause
measurement errors to be negatively correlated with the true value. If this
is the case, our estimates of percentage increases in productivity during the
first year will be biased downward. In our view, this latter type of bias is
more likely than the former.IO The sensitivity of the main findings
concerning the proportionality assumption will be tested by presenting
estimates of the growth of productivity net of training costs that are based
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on 3 alternative assumptions: proportionate differences in productivity are
in fact 50 percent of those reported, equal to those reported and 150 percent
of those reported.
Data were also obtained on the amount of time that is devoted to four
different kinds of training activities during the first 3 months on the job.
A training time index was constructed by first valuing trainer and trainee
time relative to that of workers with two years of tenure in that job and then
combining the time invested in training activities during the first 3 months
on the job.ll
v. Results
The key issue is how the growth rates of wages and productivity net of
training cost compare when training is predominantly general. Consequently, a
measure of the generality of training is needed so that the sample of jobs for
hypothesis testing can be limited to those which provide a great deal of
general training. The question which provides us with such a measure is, "How
many of the skills learned by new employees in this job are useful outside
this company?" Fifty-nine percent responded "almost all," 13 percent
responded "most," and only 7.5 percent answered "almost none." The employers
were next asked how many other local firms made use of the general skills that
were developed in their training. The jobs that offer the most general skill
training are defined to be those reported to have "almost all" of their skills
useful at other firms and 16 or more other firms in the local labor market
that in fact use these skills. Data for these jobs are presented in the first
column of table 1. The ~econd column presents data for the jobs where almost
all of the training was useful in other firms, but here the number of such
firms in the locality was small enough (below 16) to suggest that employers
might have some monopsony power. The groupings for the other three columns
are based only on the generality of the skills developed without regard to the
size of the local market for these skills.
The first two rows of the table present estimates of the real wage
increase in the first one or two years at the job.12 The starting wage is for
a period averaging 13 months prior to the interview, so real wage increases
were calculated by dividing the actual wage increases reported for the sampled
new hires by 1.071, the increase in the economy wide hourly wage (excluding
overtime) between April 1981 and May 1982. Jobs which offer training in
skills which are at least in part useful at other firms appear to command real
wage increases of only 5 to 6 percent in the first year and 2 to 6 percent in
the second year at the job (see columns 1 to 4). The increase in the real
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wage is much smaller (essentially zero for the two year wage growth figure) in
the jobs involving highly specific skills (see column 5). Thus, jobs offering
general training do have higher rates of real wage growth than jobs offering
only specific training, as predicted by theory. We now turn to the related
issue of whether the real wage growth that occurs in jobs offering
considerable general training is as large as is predicted by standard theory?
[Table 1 about here)
The percentage increases in productivity during the first two years at
the job reported in lines 3 and 4 of Table 1 are quite large. The gain in
productivity was 26 to 30 percent during the first three months (between an
initial average for the first two weeks and an average for weeks 3 through 13)
and another 19 to 25 percent by the end of the second year at the job. The
productivity gains were largest in jobs with training that developed skills of
some generality. The increase in the worker's reported productivity is
clearly considerably greater than the 8 to 12 percent increase in the worker's
real wage during the first two years at these jobs. This occurs even at the
jobs in which training was reported to be almost entirely general and for
which there are many local firms that also need the skills in question.
Lines 5 through 9 of Table 1 report answers to questions about the number
of hours devoted to four distinct training activities. During the first three
months, training for jobs with the most general training and many local
competitors involved an average of 49 hours watching others do the job, 9.6
hours in formal training, 52 hours in informal training by management, and
25.6 hours in informal training by co-workers. The time devoted to training
had a value equivalent to 147 hours of an already trained co-worker's time or
about 28.3 percent of the output that a co-worker would produce in 3 months.
As long as some of the skills taught are general, the required training time
seems unrelated to the reported degree of generality. However, jobs reported
to teach almost no skills useful in other firms required less training --118
rather than 147 hours in the first 3 months.
Line 10 of the table presents the average costs of training in the first
quarter of employment in terms of the opportunity cost of the time of a worker
with two years of tenure at the firm, OCEWT. It was calculated by dividing
the estimate of total value weighted hours of training (line 9) by 520, the
number of hours worked by a fulltime worker in three months. For jobs
requiring the most general skills, total training investment was equal in
value to 28 percent of the opportunity cost of an experienced worker's time
(OCEWT). Line 11 presents estimates of that component of training costs that
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is attributable to the time that trainers devoted to training activities
during the first quarter. This trainer time is valued at 19 percent of
OCEWT. The difference between 28 and 19 percent of OCEWT is the value of the
time that new hires spent in formal training and watching others do the job.
Line 12 presents the average decrement (relative to a worker with two years of
tenure) in reported productivity during the first quarter reported in the same
metric (OCEWT) as lines 10 and 11. It was calculated by dividing a weighted
average of reported productivity in the first two weeks (wt
- .167) and
reported productivity in the next 11 weeks (wt - .833) by mean reported
productivity of workers with two years of tenure in the job and then
subtracting the result from 1 and multiplying by 100. For jobs with the most
general skills, the productivity decrement during the first quarter is 26
percent of OCEWT.
Only one more assumption is required to calculate estimates of the rate
of growth of productivity net of training costs during the first two years at
a firm: the cost of the training that was being provided to workers with two
years of tenure on the job. While the 1982 employer survey did not ask
questions about the time devoted to training after the first 3 months on the
job, a 1983 National Center survey of employers (Hollenbeck and Smith 1984)
did ask such questions. This survey found that the proportion of time devoted
to full-time training activities during the second year on the job was about
one half of the corresponding proportion of the first month.13 Based on this
finding, it was assumed that rates of investment in training decline by one-
half between the first three months on a job and the end of the second year.
Lines 13 to 16 of Table 1 present estimates of logarithmic growth of
productivity net of training costs between the initial quarter of employment
and the end of second year at the firm. Line 13 is the preferred estimate of
the growth of productivity net of training costs. It assumes there was no
double counting of training costs: Ie. that when the employers told us that
new hires were 26 percent less productive than workers with 2 years of tenure,
they were not factoring into that calculation the fact that about 11 percent
of the new hire's time was spent in a training activity which produced
virtually no output. Under these assumptions, the calculated logarithmic
increase in productivity net of training costs for jobs with the most general
training is 51 percent which is 6 times the corresponding increase in real
wages [51/8.3].
The estimates reported in lines 14 through 16 of the table make the more
conservative assumption that there was double counting--that the lower
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productivity reported for new workers reflects in part the portion of their
time that was devoted to formal training and watching others do the work.
Line 14 was obtained by substituting line 11 for line 10 in the calculation
described in the previous paragraph. Under these more conservative
assumptions, the logarithmic growth of productivity net of training costs is
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of increase of real wages.
The sensitivity of these estimates to changes in assumptions about the
scaling of the productivity index can be examined by comparing line 14 to
lines 15 and 16. Line 15 of the table presents estimates that are based on
the assumption that the reports of productivity differences supplied by our
respondents exaggerate true proportionate differences in productivity by a
factor of two. This assumption implies that the coefficient of variation of
productivity of job incumbents is 6.5 percent, not the 13 percent that our
respondents reported it to be and not the 19 percent that studies using hard
data on output have found on average. Even under this very extreme
assumption, productivity net of training costs for the most general jobs still
grows three times faster than the real wage--25.4 percent rather than 8.3
percent. Line 16 of the table presents estimates that are based on the
assumption that proportionate differences in true productivity between new and
experienced workers are 50 percent greater than those reported (ie. that the
coefficient of variation is 19.5). Under these assumptions, the growth of net
productivity in jobs with the most general training is 8 times greater than
the growth of wage rates.
Tests of our central hypothesis -- that productivity net of training
costs rise more rapidly than compensation during the first 2 years of tenure
even in the jobs with the most general training -- are presented in table 2.
The null hypothesis actually tested was: Is the ratio of productivity net of
training cost in the first 3 months to productivity net of training cost at
the end of 2 years, NPQ1/NP2yr' equal to or greater than the ratio of hourly
compensation at the~e 2 points in time, RCQ1/RC2yr? The hypothesis was tested
under different maintained assumptions about double counting and the scaling
of relative productivity. The estimate of the ratio of real compensation at
the start to real compensation after two years was the inverse of the
exp(.083) (from line 2 of Table 1) adjusted for differences between the growth
rates of wages and compensation.
The first column of table 2 reports hypothesis tests that are conditional
on the maintained assumption that compensation grows 1 percent less than wages
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during the first two years (possibly because the value of medical benefits
does not increase in the second year of employment). The second column of the
table reports hypothesis tests under a maintained assumption that compensation
rises 4 percent faster than wage rates during the first 2 years on a job
(possibly because new employees are not eligible for paid vacation or sick
leave until they have been at the firm for a whole year)l4. An offer of two
weeks of paid vacation raises the effective wage by four percent, so a firm
which offers 2 weeks of paid vacation to employees with 2 years of tenure but
none to new hires effectively raises the growth of compensation 4 percent
above the growth of wages. This is not very common so it would appear that 4
percent is an upper bound on the differential between the growth of
compensation and wages during the first two years on a job.
[Table 2 about here]
The t-statistics reported in the table imply a decisive rejection of the
hypothesis that in jobs involving training in skills almost all of which are
reported to be useful at other firms that compensation rises at a rate that is
greater than or equal to the rise in productivity net of training costs. This
is a robust finding. Even when all of the maintained assumptions are selected
to favor the hypothesis--compensation increases 4 percent faster than wage
rates in the first two years on the job, conservative assumptions are made
regarding double counting, and the true increase in relative productivity with
tenure is only half of the amount reported by our respondents--, the
hypothesis is rejected by a wide margin.
Clearly, during the first year or so on a job, wages grow much more
slowly than productivity net of training costs even in the jobs where most of
the skills being developed by training are useful at other firms. Some of the
gap between the growth of productivity net of training costs and wages is a
consequence of specific training. Even when skills developed by training are
all useful in other firms, the package of skills is nevertheless more valuable
at the training firm than at other firms. This is because each firm requires
a different mix of general skills. The firm that does the training
concentrates on those skills it needs the most, some of which may not be as
highly valued by alternative employers. Skills that would be highly valued by
an alternative employer may not be taught because others on the staff already
fulfill that function. In other cases, later employers may not be aware of
the skills that were developed and consequently not assign the worker to a job
that makes use of them. The result is that the best fit between a worker's
skills and hisjher job is generally at the firm that did the training.
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Because of the difficulty of signaling one's general skills to potential
employers, there is no guarantee that new hires with better than average
skills will be offered comparably higher entry wages 'even when these skills
help them do the job better. These phenomena have the effect of transforming
training which the employer honestly believes develops skills that are useful
at other firms into training which is in part effectively specific to the
firm. To the extent training is effectively specific, wages will rise more
slowly than productivity net of training cost.
But the discrepancies between wage and productivity growth are too large
to be explained by specific training alone. Using conservative assumptions
regarding double counting, the increase in productivity net of training costs
was calculated to be 43.9 percent. Given this increase in the worker's net
productivity, Table 3 presents estimates of the wage increase that is implied
by a standard Becker model of OJT in which training is partially specific and
the costs and benefits of specific training are shared. The only set of
assumptions that can produce the observed 8.3 percent wage increase is that 90
percent of the training was specific and that 90 percent of the costs of
specific training were financed by the employer. The upper bound on the
discrepancy between growth rates of compensation and wage rates was 4 percent,
so the upper bound on the increase in compensation during the first two years
of tenure is 12.2 percent. For the standard model to generate a 12.2 percent
increase in compensation, it must be assumed either that 90 percent of
training is specific and employers pay 80 percent of its costs or that 80
percent of training is specific and employers pay 90 percent of its costs.
For training which was reported to be developing skills almost all of which
were useful at other firms, these assumptions seem implausible. If so, the
slow growth of wages in the first two years must have another contributing
cause such as quasi-rents arising from transition costs and sorting,
differences in marginal tax rates and borrowing rates and institutional
barriers to steep wage profiles.
[Table 3 about here]
V. SummarY and Conclusions
A number of forces have been identified which make it profitable for
employers to front load compensation during the first year or two of tenure:
(1) sources of job-worker match specificity unrelated to training such as
sorting, costs of finding a new job and the reputational damages of turnover
and (2) the progressive nature of per~onal taxation and high borrowing costs
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for workers, and (3) legal and contractual constraints on the starting wage.
Analysis of data comparing the growth of compensation to the growth of
productivity net of training costs in jobs reported to involve skills that
were useful at other firms found that during the first two years of tenure
that net productivity grows on average 4 to 5 times faster than compensation.
If the focus had been on only the first few months of tenure, the multiple by
which the growth of net productivity exceeds wage growth would have been even
larger. While the effective specificity of training that is reported to be
useful elsewhere accounts for a portion of this difference, it does not
account for all of it. Consequently, one or more of the forces listed above
must be contributing to the front-loading of compensation during the first
year or so on a job. The forces that work in the opposite direction--the need
to design wage structures to attract those with low quit probabilities and to
have the new hire put up a performance bond so as to reduce shirking--appear
to be a good deal weaker at least in the first year of tenure.
With this in mind, it becomes alot easier to see why so many employers
complain that "We pay them [apprentices] far more than they're worth" and that
other employers are poaching their trained workers. Becker's model says that
this complaint cannot be legitimate 1f all skills are general. The worker
must have paid for the training and the second period wage must equal the
worker's productivity so quits do not on average impose costs on the employer.
The model just developed implies that the employer is correct in perceiving
himself to be suffering a loss when a quit occurs. He is not, however,
according to the model presented in section 2 and 3 of the paper, losing
investments in general training. He is losing (1) the bond he put up at the
beginning of the contract to assure the new hire that the firm loses as well
if a dismissal occurs, (2) the quasi-rents generated by the investment in
information about the quality of the match and the sorting that results, (3)
the consumption loan offered up front to sweeten the compensation package and
(4) the quasi-rents resulting from training and learning-by-doing that is firm
specific.
The factors influencing wage profiles in the first year of tenure are
probably different from those influencing wage profiles of long tenure
workers. We have not formally analyzed models with three or more periods, but
it appears that the both the bonding and consumption loan effects would have
negligable or only very small effects on wage growth during the second, third,
fourth and later periods at a firm. We make this speculation because
reputational damages from a dismissal (Fb) are not likely, in our opinion, to
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increase much with longer tenure and should, in fact, decline in the decade
preceding retirement. This suggests a special need for Lazear type shirking
penalties for workers in their 50s and 60s. Consump~ion loan effects are
likely to be small because older workers are able to borrow at lower interest
rates and are more likely to have savings which yield an even lower interest
rate and because wage elasticities of turnover,
~s and
~k' are not likely to
decline much after the first year on the job. Quasi-rents derived from
sorting could be expected to increase, but we suspect that after the first
year on the job they grow rather slowly. Clearly this is an area where our
model could be usefully extended. Other extensions that appear desireable
include incorporating pay increases based on performance, defined benefit
pensions, and damages to the firm's reputation when a dismissal occurs.
Clearly the determinants of the shape of the tenure-wage profile are
many. With so many unobservable factors at work, it is unlikely that data on
wages alone can. settle issues regarding the relative contributions to
productivity growth of general and firm-specific training or the relative
importance of human capital and Lazear type bonding contracts. Richer data
sets containing information on productivity growth, wage growth. training
costs, the specificity of training, monitoring costs and other factors would
appear to be necessary before significant progress can be made in explaining
the wage profiles of workers in long tenure jobs.
TABLE 1
TRAINING, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY OF TYPICAL mY EMPLOYEES BY GENERALITY OF SKILLS TAUGHT
.
Percenta~e Wa~e Increase
1. 1st Yr (-100*10g[MEAN(RWgql/RWgCUR»)}
2. 2 Yrs (-100*10g[MEAN(RWgql/RWg2YR»)}
Percentage Increase in Productivi~
3. From Week 1-2 to Week 3-13
4. From 1st Quarter to 2nd Yr.
Hours Spent in Specific Trainin~
Activities in First 3 Months
5. Watching others do the job
6. Formal training programs
7. Informal training by management
8. Informal training by coworkers
9. Investment in training time
10. 1st Q training costs [L9/5.20)
11. 1st Q trainer costs
12. 1st Q Productivity Decrement
Growth of Productivity Net of
Training Costs-1st 0 to 2nd Yr.
13. No Double Counting
Conservative Double Counting Assumptions
14. Reported Prod. is Proport. to True
15. True Prod. Gain Half that Reported
16. True Gain 50% Greater than Reported
Number of cases
Number of Skills
Almost All
GT 16 LT 16
other other
firms firms
6.0
8.3
28
24
49
9.6
51.9
25.6
147.1
28%
19%
26%
51
43.9
25.4
66.4
557
4.9
9.5
29
24
50.9
9.3
55.8
26.9
156.5
30%
21%
26%
52.8
45.4
26.8
68.3
326
Useful Outside This Company
Most
6.0
11.9
29
25
48.1
6.3
58.1
25.2
148.9
29%
21%
27%
53.6
47
27.4
71.3
192
Some
6.0
11.9
30
21
46.3
10
53.8
22.7
147.3
28%
19%
25%
49.4
42.3
24.8
63.5
304
Almost
None
3.7
.5
26
19
27.6
. 7.9
41
27.1
118
23%
16%
22%
40.8
35.7
21.1
52.8
114
~: Sample is limited to jobs for someone hired between July I, 1980 and August, 1981 and
for which all the necessary questions on wage rates, training time, and productivity were
answered. The formulas for calculating lines 3, 4, 9 and 11 through 16 are as follows:
Line 3 - 100*10g[MEAN(ProdWK3-13)/MEAN(ProdWKl-2»).
Line4 - 100*10g[MEAN(Prod2YR)/MEAN(ProdWK3-13»).
line 9 - .8*L5 + 1.8*L6 + 1.5*L7 + L8, conceptually but editing causes some changes.
Line 11 - 100*[(1.5*L7 +L6 + L8)/520).
Line 12 - 100*{1 - MEAN[(.833*ProdWK3-13 + .167*ProdWKI-2)/Prod2YR)}, conceptually
but editing procedures cause some differences.
Line 13 - -100*10g[(100 - .5*L10 - L12)/100).
Line 14 - -100*10g[(100 - .5*L11 - L12)/100).
Line 15 - -100*log[(100 - .5*Ll1 - .5*L12)/100).
Line 16 - -100*10g[(100 - .5*L11 - 1.5*L12)/100).
Table 2
T-TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESIS THAT PRODUCTIVITY
NET OF TRAINING COSTS RISES FASTER THAN COMPENSATION
Compensation Rises
Measurement Assumptions
1 , less
than wages
4 , more
than wages
No Double Counting 18.5 15.2
Conservative Double Counting Assumptions
Reported Productivity is Proportional
to True plus Error 17.6 14.6
True Gain is Half Reported Gain 12.2 8.6
The tabulations and hypothesis tests were done using end of period levels as
the base for defining rates of change. This is necessitated by the fact that
productivity net of training costs during the first quarter is zero or
negative in some jobs. The null hypothesis was (NPQ1/NP2yr) -(RCQ1/RC2yr)~ o.
Where NP - net productivity and RC - real compensation. The hypothesis tests
make the conservative assumption that growth rates of productivity and real
compensation are independent. The sample is the same as the one producing
Column 1 of Table 1.
41.2 38.4 35.7 34.0
38.4 32.9 27.4 24.2
35.7 27.4 19.2 14.3
34.0 24.2 14.3 8.3
Table 3
WAGE INCREASES PREDICTED
BY THE
STANDARD MODEL OF ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
(Net Productivity rises 43.9 percent)
Share of Skills Develo~ed that are Firm Snecific
Share of Specific
Training Funded
by Firms
25 % 50 % 75 % 90%
25 %
75 %
50 %
90 %
Note: The standard model's predicted wage increase is equal to
43.9*[ 1 - (share skills firm specific) (share funded by firm)].
~q
FOOTNOTES
1. The existence of these transition costs helps explain why so few jobseekers take
stopgap jobs while they search for work and why so few new hires continue their
search after having accepted a job offer. Search theory attributes this to higher
search costs when employed. For some labor markets this explanation rings true,
but in so many cases the unemployed worker spends so little time in active search,
it is hard to see how having a 40 hour a week job can substantially interfere with
search of such low intensity. It is possible, however, for reputational effects
to operate in the opposite direction (ie. for T to be negative). Taking a very
.
prestigious job [ego an Assistant Professor at MIT) may so enhance reputation and
improve contacts that the distribution of job offers will shift up. Employers
whose reputation is such that taking a job there enhances the worker's marketability
can achieve target compensation levels, R, at lower cost and will typically find
it optimal to backload their compensation package.
2. For most jobs, the firm's expected costs of recruiting and selecting a replacement
if there is an unanticipated quit are considerably smaller than a worker's costs
of finding another job if terminated involuntarily. When small and medium sized
firms hire for a non supervisory position, they consider on average only nine
applications, interview only five of the applicants and devote .a total of only
10 hours of staff time to the task of filling one position. New positions are
filled an average of 16 days after beginning the search. In 55 percent of the
cases the firm had advance notice of the opening and so the job was not uncovered
during much of the search.
....
.)
. The sorting effect may be thought of as the return to investment in information
about the quality of the match. The firm learns about the trainability and
productivity of the employee and the worker learns about conditions of work, the
friendliness of coworkers and the quality of supervision and training and about
his/her talent and taste for the work. After this information generates some
separations, the employer and remaining workers receive a return on their investment
in match specific knowledge.
4. Assuming a yearly 5a = .75, unemployment spells of one-third of a year and a
DI replacement rate of .4, the ratio of the search costs resulting from an
involuntary termination to the present discounted value of future wage payments
is (1-.4)*.333/[1/{1-.75») = .05. The wage reduction that results from an
involuntary termination is in part due to the signal that it transmits. It would
not be unreasonable for this signaling effect to lower the worker's wage in
subsequent jobs by an additional 5 percent.
5. Becker clearly recognized the existence of liquidity constraints in his 1962.paper.
"Since employer specific skills are part of the intangible assets or good will
of firms and can be offered as collateral along with tangible assets, capital would
be more readily available for specific than for general investments (p.42)." He
did not, however, explicitly analyze how such constraints might influence the tenure
profile of wages and thus induce employers to front load compensation and thus appear
to share the costs of general training. Parsons (1972) points out that "The
worker's ...discount rate will affect the firm's choice of wage policies lt
can be shown that firms will decrease the worker's share of specific investment
as the workers discount the future more heavily {p.1129)."
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6. In the adverse selection models of Salop and Salop (1976) and Nickell '(1976)
workers have information not available to firms on how likely they are to quit,
so since turnover is costly, some employers attempt to attract those with low
quit probabilities by imposing a hiring fee (through a below market starting
wage) and raising the wage level in subsequent periods. The equilibrium wage
pattern results in the worker paying all the costs and receiving all the
benefits of investments in specific human capital and in wage rates which rise
in step with gains in productivity net of training costs.
7. Medoff and Abraham's findings, however, do have alternative explanations.
The data available to Medoff and Abraham provided measures of productivity and
wage rates. The theories being tested, however, specify a relationship between
productivity net of training costs and compensation. The least tenured workers
in a particular employment grade are likely to be those who have been recently
promoted into the job and/or are likely to be shortly promoted into a higher
grade. As a result, they are probably getting more intensive training than the
older, more tenured workers in that employment grade. This means that even
though productivity may be negatively correlated with tenure within an
employment grade, productivity net of training costs (production minus the
value of the time that others spend training the individual) may be ~ositively
correlated with tenure within employment grade. The other possible hole in the
Medoff and Abraham argument is that workers with vested pension rights and many
years of tenure may find that the present value of their pension benefits is
declining as they postpone retirement. If this were the case, total real
compensation of workers who are not being promoted as they approach retirement
might be falling. The analysis conducted in this paper explicitly accounts for
~rAininl Gg!~! AnQ pO§!1bl@ Qiff@rtn~@§ botwo@n ~@t,§ of 1~9Wth of W@I!! @nQ
compensation.
8. The survey was the second wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey of employers
located in 28 groups of counties scattered around the country. The sample was
drawn from lists of establishments paying unemployment insurance taxes that
were stratified by size and industry. Because the original survey was designed
to evaluate the labor market effects of welfare reform proposals, both large
establishments and establishments in industries with a high proportions of low
wage workers were over sampled. The sample under represents workers who are
employed at large establishments. The second wave attempted to conduct a
telephone interview with all the respondents in the first-wave survey and
achieved a 70 percent response rate.
9. Comparably defined nonresponse rates for other questions about the new hire
were 8.2 percent for previous relevant experience, 3.2 percent for age, 6.7 for
education, 8.6 percent for time spent in informal training by a supervisor, and
5.7 percent for a 3-question sequence from which starting wage rate is
calculated. The low nonresponse rate implies that our respondents felt that
they were capable of making such judgments and augurs well for the quality of
the data that results.
10. Further support for the proposition that the proportionality assumption
results in an understatement of percentage increases in productivity with
tenure comes from comparing the coefficients of variation of productivity in
this and other data sets. If pairs of workers who are still at the firm are
used to construct a coefficient of variation for this data set, it averages .13
for sales clerks, clerical, service and semi-skilled blue collar workers. This
estimate of the coefficients of variation is smaller than the estimates of the
, "".
"~.'~-~
,, ,, ~
..
"",
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coefficients of variation for yearly output derived from analysis of objective
ratio scale measures of output. These estimates were .265 for sales clerks,
.14 for semi-skilled blue collar workers, .167 for workers in routine clerical
jobs, .255 in clerical jobs requiring decion making and .206 in service
occupations (Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch 1988). This means that the estimates
of percentage growth rates of productivity during the first year on the job
reported in this paper are probably conservative.
11. The opportunity costs of the time of management staff members who provided
formal and informal training were assumed to be 1.5 times the opportunity cost
of the time of co-workers providing such training. Based on the mean values of
the productivity index the trainee's time was valued at 80 percent of the
opportunity cost of an experienced coworker's time. When supervisors and
coworkers are giving informal training to a new employee, the trainee is almost
invariably involved directly in a production activity. Employers report that
for informal training, the trainees are typically as productive while being
trained as they are when working alone (Hollenbeck and Smith 1985).
Consequently, informal training time is assumed to involve only the investment
of the trainer's time. The training time index is equal to 0.8 times the hours
spent watching others do the job plus 1.8 times the hours in formal training
plus 1.5 times the hours in training by management plus hours in training by
co-workers. The cost of the trainer was assumed to be two-thirds of the
foregone productivity, since formal training often involves more than one
trainee. Thus, 1.8 - (2/3)1.5 + .8. The index was constructed under an
assumption that the four training activities were mutually exclusive. This
implies that if the sum of the hours devoted to individual activities is
greater than 520, that a reporting error has occurred which overstates
investment in training. In the few cases where the sum of hours devoted to
training exceeded 520, the training time index was adjusted downward by the
ratio of 520 to the sum of the hours reported for individual activities. This
procedure reduces the mean of the index by about 10 percent.
12. The question about starting wage rates was worded as follows: "What was
's starting hourly rate including commissions and incentive pay?" If this
question was not answered, the respondent was asked "What was the usual monthly
salary including commissions and incentive pay when he started work?"
13. When the ratio derived from the 1983 survey is multiplied by the 1982
estimate of value of training in the first 3 months, we estimate that workers
with 2 years of tenure spend 5.5 percent of their time in formal training or
watching others do the work and that the time others spend training him or her
has a value of 9.5 percent of his or her productivity. One minus this latter
figure is the appropriate correction factor for the denominator when
conservative aggregation assumptions are used. For liberal assumptions the
appropriate correction factor is one minus the sum of these two figures.
14. If a new hire is not approaching retirement age, the fact that most
pensions do not vest until many years of service are accumulated has little
impact on the rate of growth of total (including pension savings) compensation
during the first two years of employment at the firm. For workers who plan to
stay at the firm until retirement, pension accruals are a relatively constant
share of earnings. Yorkers who leave shortly after the pension vests do not
get an asset of great value for they will have to wait many decades before
benefits are paid and the level of the pension depends upon current earnings
not their earnings just before retirement (McDermed, Clark and Allen 1987).
Yorkers who intend to leave before the pension vests have no pension accruals.
Since 69 percent of the new hires in the sample are under 30 and 86 percent
under 40, adding pension savings to wages to construct an estimate of full
compensation results in only a small (less than .5 percent) increase in the
calculated growth of compensation in the first two years.
~
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APPENDIX. DERIVATION
Derivatives of Probabitities
with resoect to w2:
~Pr(K)!~W2
= -~o ~Pr(S)!aW2 = ~'(l - ~o 2 Fb) = I(l-v)preK)
with resoect to «:
aPr(K)!ag
= .0 aPr(S)/og =.' (-u + ~o 2Fb) = -H-u + v)g Pr(K) g
with resoect to h:
'.
oPr(K)!oh = .0 oPr(S)/oh = .'( .0 F) = .v
Pr(K)2 b
Derivatives of the Conditional Exoectations
ilioill
CD
Definition: E(~OIK) = J 2 t~O(t)dt ! Pr(K)
W -P-g-h
2
2 -(W -P-g-h)~O 1 t~odt ~Pr(K) fO 2
~E(~OIK)/~W = -. Z 0 Z = [-(W -P-g-h)+E(~OIK)]Pr(K} Pr(K) ~W Pr(K)
~O
= 8
Pr(K) a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
~E(~OIK) .0
=-8-
~WZ Pr(K) a
~E(~OIK) .0
ag = -p;:(K)Cl.a
~E(&otK) fO
ah = - p;:(K)-a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
E(~ls)
W2_U+T-l-Pr(K)F
Definition: E(~IS) = J Pr(K) b t.f(t)dt ! PreS)
..CD
2
2 {W -U+T -(1-Pr(K»IPr(K) 0Fb.~
~E(&IS)/~W = {
Pres)
J t~ dt
Pr(S)Z
of}o(t-v)
8
=~ (W2_V+T-(I-pr(K»/pr(K)'Fb- E(~IS)}'(I-v) = ~ Gb(l-v)
PreS) Pres)
~--------------------------------------------------------------------------
'E(~IS)
=
~ 8t(I-v) 'E(~IS) = ~ Gt(-V tv)
'WZ PreS) ~g PreS) g
'E(~IS) c ~
~'vC1h
PreS) '"b
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Differentiation of (*) Pr(S}Pr(K)'G
a
(Ga = Ptgth+E("0IK)-W2)
2 4>0 to ~o
~Qa/8W = Pr(K) ~ - 1 8~/8g = 1 - pr(K)~
~Qa/8h = 1 -
pr(K)~
2w.r.t. W
(8pr(S)/8W2'Pr(K) +'8pr(K)/8w2,pr(s)}~ + pr(S)pr(K)'8~/8W2
.
~
.
2 0
= (8Pr(S)/8W 'Pr(K) - ~OPr(S)}Qa + Pr(S)'Pr(K)(pr(K)'a - 1)
2
= aPr(S)/8W 'Pr(K)''a - Pr(S)'Pr(K)
w.r.t. fl
8Pr(S)/ag'Pr(K)'~ + Pr(S)'Pr(K)
w.r.t. h
'Pr(S)/8h'Pr{K)'\, + PreS) 'Pr(K)
Differentiation of c**) Pr(S)Pr(K)~
Fb(~ = w2_V+T-E(~IS)-(I-pr(K»/Pr(K).Fb = Gb - pr(K)
'1b/8W2 = 1 - ~ 6t(l-v) - v = (I-v)(l - ~ Gt)
Pres) Pres)
~~*/8g = -v - ~ Gt(-V + v) + v = (-V +v)(l - ~ Gt)b g PreS) g g PreS)
~ ~
~'t/8h = - ~'v + v = v(l - Qt>
PreS) PreS)
2
w.r.t. W
9
,{~Pr(S)/~W2oPr(K) + ~pr(K)/~W2opr(S)}°Gt + Pr(S)Pr(K).(I-v)(1 - I Gt)
PreS)
=
{1(I-v).Pr(K) + ~pr(K)/~w2opr(s)}o~+ Pr(S)Pr(K).(I-v)(1- I It)
Pres)
2
= ~Pr(K)/~W oPr(S)°Gt + Pr(S)Pr(K).(I-v)
= -~oPr(S)Gt + Pr(S)Pr(K)(I-v)
1
= -~oPr(S)(~ - prlK)Fb) + Pr(S)Pr(K) - Pr(S)Pr(K)v
=
Pr(S)Pr(K) - ~oPr(S)~
w.r.t. ~
~oPr(S)~ - Pr(S)Pr(K)Ug
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Since the objective function and constraint are given by
Max P - C(g,h)
-
WI
+ 6 [Pr(K)Pr(S)Q ]a (*) a
1
s.t R ~ W + 6b[Pr(S)Pr(K)8t + V-T],
(**)
we can obtain (5'), (6'), and (7') by substituting the above results.
Derivation of (13')
Denote K = Pr(K), S = PreS), K' = ~Pr(K)/~W2, S' = ~pr(S)/~W2. The foc for
W2 is written as
6a[S'.K'~ - S.K] + 6b[S.K + K'oSo~] = 0
~
=
P+g+h+E(~0IK)-W2 = 11-w2, Xl = P+g+h+E(~OIK)
Ot = w2_p-;+T-E(~IS)+Fb= W2 + 12 12 = P+;-T+E(~IS)-Fb
A A
Define 8 = 8'/S (>0) and K = K'/K «0), and dividing through by SoK the foc
i. rewritten as
6a[S.(11-W2) - 1] + 6b[1 + K(W2+12)]
= 0
10
2 A A A
a=) W (6aS - 6bK) = 6aSOXI - 6a + 6b + 6bKOX2
a=) W2
= X - 8(X -X ) -
6a- 6b
112 6 S - 6 K
a b
-6 K
where 8
=
b
6aS - 6bK
A 2 A 2
~K = -K.W , ~S = S.W
Also, using elasticities
6b~K
= [)
a
~
S
+
[)
b
~
K'
and
(elastici ties)
6a- 6b
6aS - 6bK
A
XI-X2 = (g-g}+h+E(~OIK)+T-E(~IS)+Fb
6a-6b 2
= [) +6 oW, and
a'YS b'YK
Thus
2 6a-6b 2(13') w = P+g+h+E(~ O'K} - 8[(g-;)+h+E(~ o IK)+T-E(~IS)+F b] - .w[)a~ S+6b~K
Derivation of (14') and (15')
The foc for g and W2 are
(~') Cg = 6a[~0(V-P)oKo~ + SoK] + 6b(I-SoK)P + ~OS°'b]'
(5') 0 = 6a[~.(I-v)oKo~ - SoK] + 6b[SoK - ~O.SoGb).
Adding RHS of (5') to (6') we obtain (14')
(14') Cg = 6a~(I-P)oKo~ + 6b{(I-SK)P + SK}.
An alternative expression is obtained by removinr tl fro. (j') (This
a
corresponds to old (14'». Multiply (v-P)/(l-v) to (5') and subtract the
result from (6').
(14") C = 6 S.K.(~) + 6b{P + ~OS.A (~) - V~l-P)SK}.g a A-V ~ £-v -v
Also, the expression for Ch can be 80dified by 8ubstituting the
W2. Again addition of the RHS of (5') to the foe for h (6,):
(6,)
Ch = 6a[S.K + ~.v.K.~) + 6b~OS.Gb'
foc for
11
Zt
./\.-1
:,.(~!Jd.~:J
,
fI
[(A~r)~.So-+(A~r)J.S-]q9+(A~I)J.S'89=q:>L.9!)
spyaT~~~ot'8AO.a~~O
'J.SQ9+~.J._'89=q:>(.91)
.C
spyaT"
[~.s.o~-J.S]Q9+[J.S-~.J.(A-I)._].9=0(.9)
....
~~
---------.
------------
s:XIGNtIddV
20.5. In the first three months of employment,
approximately how many total hours does a
typic:&!new employee in NAME'Sposition
spend away from normal work activities
filling out forms and being told about
the company history, benefits and rules?
--
RECORD HOURS
~. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 97
DK. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 98
}iA... . . . . . . . . . . .. 99
-) 206.During the first three months,
how many total hours does the
average new employee spend in
training activities in which
he or she is watching other
people do the job rather than
doing it himself?
---
RECORD HOURS
mriE. . . . . . . . . . .. 997
DK. . . . . . . . . . .. 998
}iA... . . . . . . . . .. 999
207. How many weeks does it take
a new employee hired .'or this
posi'tion ~ become fully tra1necl
and quaUfied if he or she has no
previous experience in this job,
but has had the necessary
school-provided training?
---
RECORD WEEKS
~. . . . . . . . . . .. 997
DI 998
w . . . . . . . . . .. 999
201. How many of the skills learned by
1Iewemployees in this job aTe
useful outside of this ccmpsny?
(READ LISI')...
Almost a1l I
Most 2
Sorne 3
Or almostnone .
DK B
N/\"' 9
209. Focusing on the skills that are
useful outside your company, how
many other companies in the loc:a.1
Jaber market have jobs that require
these skills? Wouldyou suess
(READ LIST)...
less than .5 1
, to1, 2
16 to 100 3
or over 100 ~..
DK I
N A 9
48-49
50-52
53-55
56
57
7
NAME I: NAME 2:
2S7A. Was (NAME'S)separation a Layoff.-..-.... -1 LayoH...............l 70/71
layoff, a discharge, Discharge........ 2 Discharge.......... 2
an induced resigna- Induced Induced
tion, or a voluntary Resignation..... 3 Reslgnation._.. 3
resignation? Voluntary Voluntary
(PEOPLE ARE "INDUCED Resignation_..." Resigna tion...... ,.
TO RfSIGN" PRIMARILY Ott\er ......-..... , Other ...-.-....... ,
BECAUSETHEY WOULDBE DK______. a DK......._.~...._.. a
DISCHARGEDOR BECAUSE N~._._...... 9 NA...................'
SUPERVISORSHAD EXPRESSED
DISSATISFACTION WITH THEIR. PERFORMANCE.)
2.5&A.The following questions ask about employee earnings. If possible,
please give earnings in hourly terms.
2SBB. Is (N)>IE1 's) job p&id (READUSI') Hourly (c;o TO 2.59) ... 1
By a1aty (GO TO 2.59) 2
10045commission
72
(GO TO 2.5,> 3
Piece rate (CO TO 2.5') ~ 4
Strai&ht time or saJary°plus tips,
incentives and ccmnissions
(ASK 2S8C) S
DK (GO TO 259) 8
NA.(r~ 10 259) 9
~sc. What type of incentive ~ offered
(READ LIST)-
Commlssion 1 'l3
TIps ." ""''''''''''-'''''''''.'''.'''''' 2
Croup inc:entivnJ 3
IndlviduaJ incentives If
DK. 118.r ~._r rT"".".."""",,,.,,. I
'/4-'/8-01.
79-80- U9
0 /:.11
%-01..
0 m ID: 2-S
6-9
NA ,
~,. What is the average hourly rate
paid to workers in (NAME:1"s) position
who have had 2 years of experience
in this job? Please include any
commissions, bonuses or incentive pay
in your estimate.
$- _8_-
DOLLARS CENTS
DK "'1
NA ""
22
NAME 1
260. What was (NAMf1S)
Stat'tinRhourly (GOTO 263) $--.--
rate indudinS DOt.1..ARSCENTS
commissiona,and DK(ASK261)_""
incentive pay? NACCOTO 263)""
NAME 2
(GO TO 263) $ .
-------
OOWRS ca..7S
DK(ASK 261)"'1
NA(GQ TO 263)""
$--, $ ~---
D01J.ARS DOLLARS
OK ,,,,. -.. "", DK".I r 11.A1..
261. What was (NAME'S)
~
rncnthly sa1&ry
inc:luc1ing commissions
and incentive pay
when (he/she) started
work? (RECORD IN
WHOLE DOLLARS, IF (NAME> WORKS
WS THAN 1 YEAR &ASE SALARY ON
NUMBER MONTHS WORKED.)
NA. 1It ~-..
"",
262. Hew rNfty hours
did (NAMf) usually
work a week?
--
HOURS
DKJ.J.' . l.1
N.A
263. What is NAME'S
~hcurlywqe (GO TO ~-'--
indudlna c:omm.Lalcns DOLLAllSC!NTS
and inc8nUvepay? DK(ASK2~)_"'1
(E~ 1f NAME NA(COTO 265>""
HAS L.£FT CO.)
OR, IF ~) lIASLEFT mfPANY READ:
What was NAME'S hourly wage including tips,
comissions and incentive pay when he/she
left your 'cc:mpany. <RECORD RESPONSE, '!HEN
SKIP.1O 265.) . .
264. What is (NAME's)
current .p:mthly salary,,- .
including tips, c:cmni-
ssions and incentive pay?
(IF NAME HAS LEFT CCMPANY,
ASK: What was NR-iE'S monthly
salary when he left the canpany?)
'---OOIl.ARS
DK 99998
NA 99999
N,A 1 Ir. I T
",,1
,,,"
--
HOURS
'1
"
DK 1I~' 111 I
"
N~ lfU
V' "
(GOTO265)$-
-'--
OOLLARS CENTS
DK(ASK 261J)"'1
NA(COTO265"", .
.
-----
OOLLARS
DK 99998
NA 99999
1'-13/14-17
28-:2/23-27
38-29/30-32
32-3$/36-39
40-44/45-49
23
26'. How many hours
dcl:s/did (NAME)
usually wrk a week?
266. Has (NAME)
received a
promotion, or
an upgrading
of Chis/her)job
responsibillties
sinc:e being hired?
267. Approximately how
many months after
being hired did
(he/she) receive
~e promotion?
26&. Have you received
or do you expect
to receive a tax
NAME 1
--
HOURS
DK 98
NA .....9'
Yes(ASK267)_- 1
No (GO TO 268) 2
DK (CO TO 26&)- 8
NA (CO TO 261) 9
aedit or govern-
ment reimbursement
of pan of your U"aining
.
costs for hiring (NAME)?
269. Did you know you
would be eligible
for this at me
time you hired
(NAME)?
24
. NAME 2
--
HOURS
DK .98
NA .."
Yes (ASK267) 1
No (GO TO 261) 2
DK (GO TO 26&)___8
NA (GO TO 26&) 9
---
RECORD MONTHS
DK 998
NA 999
Yes(GO TO 269) 1
No (GO TO Z71A) 2
DK (GO TO 271A)_1
NA (GO TO 27 1A).. 9
Yes(GO TO 271)_.. 1
No(ASK270)_- 2
DK (GO TO 271).. 8
NA (GO TO 271).. 9
---
RECORD MONTHS
DK. n.. 991
NA 999
Yes(GO TO 269)- 1
No (GO TO 271A>_. 2
DK (GO TO 271A)- a
NA (CO TO 271A)- 9
Yes(GO TO 271)- 1
No (ASK 270)- 2
DK (CO TO 271).. a
NA (GO TO 271).. 9
50-51/£2-53
54/55
56-58/59-81
62/63
64/65
r 270. When did you learn
(NAME) was eligible?
--- 19_-
MO VR
- 19
-- --
MO .VR~
OK '""8 OK '""8
NA """ NA """
271. From which program
is the money corning?
1rJrrc: l TJTC 1
WIN Tax Credit.. 2
CETA-OJT 3
WINTax Credit-2
CETA-OJT 3
WIN-oJT 4 WIN-OJT II
Other Government.
Subsidy
SPECIFY
OK_.8
NA 9
271A.The questions in this seetjon ask about worker training and
supervision for NAME.Sposition.
,
Other Government
Subsidy
SPECIFY ,
DK 8
NA 9
.. Once we get started if you find it is ne<:essary for me to talk to a supervisor for
that position please transfer me to him/her at the end
of this interview.
271B.1F YOU MUST SPEAK TO A SUPERVISOR ASK SECTIONS "C'. ANO .eo". ASK
FOR SUPERVISOR AT END OF INTERVIEW. ASK 271C - 2all~
21lC. Is there formal training, such as
self-paced lea.nWJg programs or training
done by specially trained personnel, for
people hired in NAME' s posi~ion, or is all
the training done as informal on the job
training?
66-'lZ/'l2-'l7
78 - bZ
79 - I
80 - 1
C.12
Z-bZ
NEW ID: 2-5
6/7
Formal training . . .~ 272
'.' .1
All Wormal . . . GOTO 273 . . .2
DK. . . . . .ASK272. . . . .8
NA. . . . . .ASK272. . . . .9
~
8
25
273. IF Nar ALREADY READ, READ:
In the following questions I am going to ask for canparisons
amongNAMES 1 and 2 and I2!:!!:typical new employee in the same
position.
Now switching to informal training during their first 3 months of
work, what was the ~ number of hours management and line
supervisors spent away from other activities giving informal
individualized training or extra supervision to:
A. Your typical worker in
(NAME'S) position.
18-20
---
RECORD HOUR
Some, DKiJ 996
None 997
DK 998
~J\ ~9
(,
B. NAME 1 (IF NOT THERE
FOR 3 MONTHS ASK: For
the period he/she was
'there how many hours
of informal training
did he/she receive?)
---
21-23
RECORD HOUR
Some, DKI 996
Norte 997
DK 998
NA 999
C. NAME 2 (IF NOT THERE
FOR 3 MONTHS ASK: For
the period he/she was
there, how many hours .
of informal traWng
did he/she receive?)
---
24-26
RECORD HOUR
Some, DKI 996
Norte 997
DK 998
NA 999
INTERVIEWER N1I'E: IF RESPCMEm" ANSWERS QUESTI~ 273A., B, or C IN '1m1S
OF MYS, WEBS OR M:NIHS ~ You mean NAa'E received training 8.hours
a day for
-
days/weeks/mnths?
IF 273A, B ~ C ARE me ASK 274. O'IHERWISEG) TO 277.
27
2'l4. Howmany different managementf. 27-28
and supervisory level persons - -RECORD NUMBER
. give your typical employee:in Some, DKI...........-.. 96
(NAME'S)position informal DK......................... '8
training? NA......................... 99
275. About how many total days of - - 29-30
informal training does the typical RECORD DAYS
management level person spend Some, DK'................ 96
informally training your typical DK.....__..............',a
new employee in (NAME'S)position? NA......................... 99
276. Howmany hOurs each day does . 31-32
the typical management person speD\~ RECORD HOURS
away fran performing other duties Some, DKfI...__...-. 96
in order to inforslly train a None..._.._-.--.. 97
',., typical new employee? DK.................-...... 98
~~.......................~
.-
,~,-~, ~_.~..I
28
t277. During the first 3 months of work what was the !2!!! number of hours
co-workers who are not supervisors spent away from their normal work
giving informal individualized training or extra supervision to:
.'-
A. Your typical worker in
(NAME'S)position. ---
J3-3$
RECORD HOUR
Some, DKn 996
None 997
DK 998*
NA 999
B. NAME 1 (IF NOT THERE
FOR 3 MONTHS ASK: For
the period he/she was
there how many hours
of informal training.
did he/she receive~
---
;;o-~6
RECORD HOURS
Some, DKI 996
None 997
DK 998 *
NA 999
'~ C. NAME 2 (IF NOT THERE
FOR 3 MONTHS ASK: For
the period he/she was
there how many hours
of informal training
did he/she receive?)
---
39-41
REtORD HOUR
Some, DKIJ 996
None 997
DK 998 It
N A 999
INTERVIEWER N01'E: IF RESPONDE.\1'J'ANSWERSQUESTID: j 277A, B
.2!. C IN TER.\IS
OF MYS, WEEKS ORt-nm5 READ: You mean NN-fEreceived training 8 hours
a day for _days/weeks/months? .
. (*)
IF E2A, B
~
C AREALL DKASK 278. O'nrERJ\'ISEGOTO
-~!b
,
~~
...-
- -
42..41
RECORD NUMBER .
Some, DKI......_........ 96
None......................... 97
DK......................... 98
NA......................... 99
--
44-45
- -
RECORD DAYS
Some, OKI................ 96
None......................... 97
DK......................... '8
NA.........................'9
46-4'1
- -RECORDHOURS
Some, DKI........-...... 96
Nor\e......................... 97
DK......................... 98
NA......................... 99
,..
~
278. How many different
co-workers give your
typical employee in
(NAME'S)position
informal training?
..
279. About haw many total days
or informal training does the
average co-worker spend on
training your typical new em-
ployees in (NAME'S)position?
.
.
280. Howmanyhours each day does
the average co-worker spend
away fran performing other duties
in order to infomally train a
typical new employee?\I
281. The last set of questions in thi~ section
asks about employee productivity.
Please rate your employee OI\ a productivity
scale of zero to;WO, wheTe 100 equals the maxim\Jn
productivity rating my of your employees (NAME'S)
position can attain and zero is absolutely no
productivity by your employee.
48-S0b'L
..,
30
'" 282. What productivity score would
you give your typical worker
who has been in this job for
2 years? (PROBE FOR NUMBER)
. S~3-
RECORD NUMBER
DK 998
NA '9'
233. Now, for each of the following time periods compare the productivity on this same scale
of (NAME 1), (NAME 2) and your typical worker in this position. What is the
prod1.1ctivity c;£ (NI\ME/your typical worker) during (READ LISn . . .
A. (Hls/her) first 2 weeks
of employment?
.
..
B. From (his/her) 3rd
week to the 12 week
at work? (IF NAME 11
NA\IE 2 Lm CXJoiPAN'l BEFORE
12th WEEK - Q. 257 . 00 Kn'
~K Q. 283C)
\'
c. (DO NOT ASK FOR TYPICAL
WORKER) Today?
OR, IF tWoiE NO LCNGER1«)RJ(S
FOR CGIPANY READ: The last
week NM-fEworked for your
.
~any?
NAME 1 NAME 2' TYPICAL WORKER
--- --- --- S4-SS/S7-S9jSO-S2
RECORD II RECORD II
NONE..997 NONE..P97
DI..99S DI..99S
NA..999 NA..999
RECORD fJ
mNE. .997
DK. .998
NA. .999
- - -. ~j/a~8/o9-71
RECORD II
DK_998
NA..999
**
---
RECORD' RECORDII
CK..998 CK_998
NA..999 NA..999
*. 72-74/7S-77--- ---
RECORD' RECORD ,
CK_998 CK_998
NA..999 NA..999
78 31,
'19-80 -12
283A.IF TYPICAL WORKER - IS LESS PRODUCTIVE
AFnR 2 YEARS (Q.282 IS LESS THAN Q. 2J3B, TYPICAL
WORKER.) ASK 284. OTHERWISE GO TO 284A.
<.'
.,
C.l3
7 - 32.
,Vet,.}I;): 2-S
31
